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Introduction 
The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit is an autobiographical story of the 
expulsion of Arab Jews from Egypt after the 1956 Suez War. After 
the book was published the author, Lucette Lagnado, received a letter 
from a retired Egyptian diplomat who wrote ‘almost no one wants to 
admit the horrible… even criminal way Egyptian Jews have been 
treated.” As Lagnado commented, ‘I realized that after forty years, 
my family—and tens of thousands of others--had finally 
obtained…what they had most wanted, other than the ability to 
return: An apology—an acknowledgment of our pain.”2 
According to a United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 
“victims of gross violations of international human rights law and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law” have the right to 
a remedy. Remedies include inter alia “Public apology, including 
acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;” 
                                                 
1
Peter Baehr, Mark Gibney, Nava Löwenheim, Joanna Quinn, and Doron 
Shultziner offered valuable comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript, as did 
Peter Malcontent and Marcus Duwall: I am grateful to all of them. I also thank 
Kwan-Sen Wen for his research assistance, and the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation for appointing Mr. Wen as my research assistant. I am 
grateful to the Canada Research Chairs program for the funds and time to write 
this chapter, and to Wilfrid Laurier University for appointing me to my Chair.  
2 Lucette Lagnado, The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit: A Jewish Family’s Exodus from 
Old Cairo to the New World ( New York, Harper Perennial, 2008), Post script 15.  
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“Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth;” 
and guarantees of non-repetition, all aspects of a complete and 
satisfactory apology. Victims are defined as “persons who individually 
or collectively suffered harm” as well as “the immediate family or 
dependants of the direct victim.” Thus, evolving international law 
requires apologies to victims and their direct family members for 
gross violations of their human rights. This Resolution, however, 
does not call for retrospective apologies for events that have no 
surviving victims or family members or dependants.3 Nevertheless, 
since the 1980s official apologies have proliferated.4 
I define an official apology as an apology by a corporate 
entity with standing to represent a group of some kind. The 
corporate entity is often a state, but could also be a business or a 
private group such as a religious community. The corporate entity 
issues the apology in the name of the group it represents, such as the 
citizenry of a country, the officers and shareholders of a corporation, 
or the members of a religious community. The individual who 
delivers the actual apology has standing to do so because she 
officially represents the corporate entity, regardless of whether the 
incident or words for which she is apologizing occurred during her 
tenure in office. Many corporate entities such as states last over 
centuries; just as a successor government of a state takes over the 
monetary debts accrued by previous governments, so it takes over 
the legal and moral debts of its predecessors. 
Decisions to issue official apologies raise complex questions 
about trans-generational justice, or justice from living people to past 
                                                 
3 General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,’ 
GA Resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005. Section V, Article 8; Section VIII, 
Article 22, e; Article 22, b: Article 23. 
4 For explanations of most of the apologies mentioned in this chapter, as well as 
links to the texts of the actual apologies and/or press articles about them, see 
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Editor, Political Apologies and Reparations Website, 
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, http://political-
apologies.wlu.ca. 
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generations. Individual members of corporate entities often oppose 
apologies issued in their name on the grounds that they are not 
personally guilty of actions taken by either their actual biological, or 
their corporate, ancestors. Many private citizens opposed an apology 
for the slave trade by Britain on the grounds that neither they nor 
their ancestors were involved in the trade, and they therefore did not 
want the British government to apologize in their name. This 
appeared to be, for them, a matter of human dignity or moral stature; 
they did not want to be held culpable for an act for which they bore 
no personal guilt.5  Although an official apology bore no material 
costs, the moral cost to them was the undermining of their ancestors’ 
reputations.  
In favour of official apologies for past wrongs, one can argue 
that while guilt, or fault, is an attribute held by an individual only if 
she has actually committed a harmful act, responsibility is another 
matter. Membership in a corporate entity means the individual shares 
in the entity’s responsibility to ameliorate the consequences of 
injustices that it perpetrated. The corporate entity bears this moral 
responsibility even if its actions or lack of action were legal at the 
time they occurred.6 Moreover, the human dignity of those whom the 
entity has wronged is at stake, and overrides any damages to the 
human dignity of individual members of the corporate entity that 
might be a consequence of the apology. If no apology for the harm is 
offered, then the wronged are not recognized as morally equal human 
beings, deserving of respect from those who wronged them. Even if 
the actual victims are dead, their descendants may still suffer from the 
grievous wrongs inflicted on their ancestors and still be in need of 
“moral restitution.”7   
 
                                                 
5 Michael Cunningham, ‘“It Wasn’t Us and We Didn’t Benefit”: The Discourse of 
Opposition to an Apology by Britain for its Role in the Slave Trade,’ The Political 
Quarterly, vol. 79, no. 2, 2008: 252-59.  
6 Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Justice  
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), xviii-xix. 
7 Robert R. Weyeneth, ‘The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical 
Reconciliation,’ The Public Historian, vol. 23, no.3, 2001: 31. 
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Types and Functions of Official Apologies 
Much of the literature on official apologies conflates different types 
of apologies for different types of events and between different 
actors, as if the content, enactment, and effects of the apologies do 
not vary according to the situation. By contrast, I suggest that official 
apologies can be divided into at least three categories: diplomatic 
apologies, political apologies, and historical apologies. 
Diplomatic apologies occur between states. One state has 
offended another—sometimes unintentionally—and the offender 
state wishes to repair diplomatic relations. An example is the apology 
tendered by the United States to China for accidentally bombing the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, when NATO attacked Serbia 
to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from the Serbian province 
of Kosovo. The function of these apologies is straightforward, to 
restore relations to the status quo ante. The two parties often negotiate 
the content of the apology before it is offered, so that both sides can 
save face within the public act of contrition and its acceptance. 
 Apologies by corporate entities for past actions are less 
straightforward. Although frequently they are all referred to as 
apologies for historical wrongs,8 it is useful to separate them into two 
categories, political and historical apologies. Political apologies are for 
acts that have continuing political relevance, where there are real 
political risks such as vengeful attacks or social disruption if the 
offending party does not apologize to the offended. These wrongs 
may be for acts perpetrated within living memory—some victims or 
their immediate heirs are still alive—or for acts perpetrated much 
earlier that nevertheless still so affect the descendants of the 
immediate victims as to have continuing political relevance. For 
example, the government of Germany apologized in 2004 for the 
genocide of the Herero people of South-West Africa (now Namibia) 
by German colonists and the German army between 1904 and 1908.9 
While there were probably no, or very few, living survivors of that 
                                                 
8 Michael R. Marrus, ‘Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice,’ 
Journal of Human Rights, vol. 6, no. 1, 2007: 75-105.   
9 Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Reparations to Africa ( Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 100-02. 
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genocide, resentment of Germany by citizens of Namibia could 
disrupt German-Namibian relations.   
Thus, one inter-state function of political apologies is to 
restore relations that were intentionally ruptured during warfare, 
conquest, or other large-scale events. Such apologies also 
demonstrate respect for international laws, thus contributing to the 
preservation of international order and stability.10 For example, Japan 
has apologized frequently for acts perpetrated against other Asian 
states such as Korea that it colonized and conquered before and 
during WWII. Germany has issued many statements of regret and 
apologies to Israel, the Jewish community, and European countries 
that it conquered during WWII, starting with a statement of regret 
issued by the first post-WWII Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, in 
1951.11  
Political apologies can be internal to a state as well as between 
states. An intra-state function of political apologies is to restore or 
rectify a wrongdoing entity’s sense of its own self. Both Canada and 
the United States issued apologies to individuals of Japanese descent 
who were interned and deprived of their property during WWII, 
ostensibly because they might have been acting on behalf of Japan, a 
member of the enemy Axis powers. Japanese-Americans and 
Japanese-Canadians are very small percentages of their respective 
countries’ populations and do not appear to have any electoral 
influence, but in retrospect the internment grossly violated their 
human rights. The American and Canadian apologies to these two 
groups are part of a larger project to declare the respective countries 
non-racist and multicultural. Similar concerns can motivate newly 
democratizing states. In 1992, for example, the President of Hungary 
apologized to foreign students and Roma for attacks on them by 
right-wing and racist forces, and indifference to their plight by 
Hungarian police. In this case, it has been suggested, the President 
                                                 
10 Nava Löwenheim, ‘A Haunted Past: Requesting forgiveness for wrongdoing in 
International Relations,’ Review of International Studies, vol. 35, 2009: 554.  
11 Löwenheim, 549-53.  
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was trying to reinforce the new, post-Communist Hungary’s identity 
as a liberal, nondiscriminatory society.12  
Another intra-state function of political apologies is to restore 
the dignity of the individuals or groups that were wronged,13 so that 
they can be more fully (re)incorporated into the democratic body 
politic as equal citizens.14 The apology is also educative, teaching 
those who might not know about past wrongs—or realize the harm 
the wrongs cause even to current generations—about what 
happened. If the wider public supports the apology, then there is a 
greater chance for “societal reconciliation.”15  
Although there is some overlap, strictly historical apologies 
can be separated from political ones. Historical apologies are for 
events that occurred in the distant past and that are not part of the 
actual lived experience of current members of states or communities. 
They are apologies for acts that do not have any particular present 
political relevance, even if they wronged the ancestors of a particular 
group of people. Such apologies are directed to the descendants—
either individuals or corporate bodies—of those presumed to have 
been harmed by the historic act, and can be either inter- or intra-
state. Intra-state apologies are numerous, such as those offered by the 
governments of settler states (Canada, the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand) to indigenous peoples.  
Apologies for historical events raise questions not pertinent 
to diplomatic or political apologies. Returning to the debate about a 
British apology for the slave trade mentioned above, for example, 
even if the United Kingdom was responsible in part for the 
transatlantic slave trade, commentators question for what, at this late 
date, it ought to apologize. They also ask what “credit” the United 
                                                 
12 Elizabeth Kiss, ‘Saying We’re Sorry: Liberal Democracy and the Rhetoric of 
Collective Identity,’ Constellations, vol.4, no. 3, 1998: 387-98. 
13 Nick Smith, I was Wrong: the Meaning of Apologies ( New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008),  10. 
14 John Borneman, ‘Public Apologies as Performative Redress,’ SAIS Review, vol. 
25, no. 2, 2005: 59-60. 
15 Melissa Nobles, The Politics of Official Apologies (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008),  70. 
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Kingdom receives for its attempt in the 19th century to abolish the 
trade. Moreover, some argue that not only European slave buyers, 
but also African slave sellers, were responsible for the trade, 
absolving the United Kingdom of some of its responsibility. Finally, 
it is not clear to whom—descendants of enslaved Africans, the 
continent of Africa, or Britons offended by the very idea of a slave 
trade—an apology might be owed. In the event, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair in 2006 expressed general “sorrow” for the slave trade, rather 
than offering an outright apology.  
If the acts for which historical apologies are offered have no 
contemporary political relevance, why should they be made? A 
nation’s security is not threatened if they are not offered. Historical 
apologies have a symbolic and integrative function, however; 
members of groups that suffered historical wrongs are more likely to 
feel a respected part of the relevant political entity if they receive an 
apology, no matter how late. Apologies help groups that suffered 
severe wrongs become members of the national community.16 Similar 
reasons influence non-state entities’ decisions to apologize. The 
Roman Catholic Church apologized to God for its treatment of 
women and indigenous people in the hope that members of these 
groups would feel more fully welcomed (back) into the Church. The 
Church also apologized to God for its poor relations with Jews, both 
to maintain good relations with the Jewish community and to re-
establish the Church’s sense of itself as genuinely Christian, in the 
modern sense of universal love. 
 
Complete Apologies 
Much philosophical and social scientific discussion of what 
constitutes a complete, and presumably successful, apology exists. 
Most scholars who discuss this question propose similar lists of 
requirements, many deriving their list from inter-personal, rather than 
official, apologies. For example, Tavuchis maintains that an apology 
must “acknowledge the fact of wrongdoing, accept ultimate 
responsibility, express sincere sorrow and regret, and promise not to 
                                                 
16 Nobles, 1-41. 
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repeat the offense.”17 This is generally acknowledged to be a 
minimum definition of a complete apology. An interpersonal apology 
is an acknowledgement of the dignity of the individual who has been 
wronged. It recognizes that person’s suffering; the apologizer 
expresses remorse for having caused a fellow human being pain. This 
results, it is hoped, in an equalization of the relationship between the 
two parties to the apology and a restoration of the good relations that 
are presumed to have existed before one party wronged the other; the 
apology requires victims and perpetrators of a past wrong to morally 
identify with one another. 
Most scholars of official apologies agree on a core set of 
definitional attributes similar to but more extensive than the 
attributes of an interpersonal apology. These attributes include 
establishment and acknowledgement of the facts of the case, so that 
they are not in dispute and a common history accepted by both the 
apologizer and the recipient of the apology can be written. In making 
the apology, the apologizer must also identify each wrong committed, 
so as not to obscure the enormity of the harm perpetrated on the 
recipients. Both sides must agree that the apologizer represents the 
entity responsible for the wrong committed, and the apologizer must 
accept that responsibility, thus absolving the recipients of any residual 
psychological feeling that perhaps they caused the harm by their own 
actions. The apology must be sincere, and the apologizer must show 
regret and remorse for harming the recipient, making clear that it 
believes its actions were wrong. Such emotional characteristics are in 
the eye of the recipient of the apology; if not correctly “performed,” 
by the apologizer, the apology has little value to its recipient. The 
apologizer must show both empathy and respect for the recipients, in 
order to re-balance the relationship between the two of them and 
undo any diminution of the recipients’ social worth implied by the 
wrong the apologizer earlier committed. The apologizer also has to 
promise not to repeat the action for which it apologizes. Finally, the 
apologizer must have standing to make the apology: while in 
                                                 
17 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), vii.   
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interpersonal apologies the apologizer must be the individual who 
actually committed the wrong, in official apologies she must be the 
legitimate representative of the entity responsible for the 
wrongdoing.  
Expression of emotion is not as important in an official as a 
personal apology. Recipients recognize that a spokesperson for a 
corporate entity who is not herself guilty of the past wrong (for 
example, because she was not yet born) cannot be expected to show 
the same level of remorse as an individual apologizing for a wrong 
for which she is directly responsible. On the other hand, an official 
apology requires more actors than an interpersonal one; whereas the 
latter is a private matter, the former is public. The publics of both the 
apologizer (for example the citizenry of a state) and those receiving 
the apology (for example the members of the group that suffered the 
wrong) have to be aware of the apology. Often, moreover, both 
parties negotiate the form and content of the apology ahead of time, 
as well as who is to be the spokesperson for the apologizing entity. 
The apology is often surrounded by ritual, sometimes also negotiated 
in advance. The venue where the apology is to take place, its décor, 
clothing to be worn, music to be performed, speeches to be made, 
and persons to attend, are all negotiated. 
These negotiated aspects of official apologies are important, 
as apologies seen to be perfunctory can do more harm than good. 
The government of Canada apologized twice to its indigenous 
peoples. In 1998, Jane Stewart, then Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs, delivered the apology. Although it was sincere, it was not 
delivered by then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, who did not even 
attend the ceremony,18 it was not widely publicized, and it was not 
surrounded by ritual. In 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
apologized to Canada’s indigenous peoples again for the federal 
government’s role in the Indian residential schools system, this time 
in the House of Commons, in the presence of many invited guests 
from the aboriginal communities.  
                                                 
18 Nobles, 74.  
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There is some debate as to whether an apology can be 
complete and ultimately successful if it does not include material 
reparations. Minow argues that “Valuing the losses from torture and 
murder strains the moral imagination;”19 nevertheless, monetary 
reparations have a symbolic value. Money has a certain “social 
gravity” that is a measure of the sincerity of an apology.20 Symbolic 
reparations or token amounts of money, such as the Can$21,000 
given to each living survivor of the Japanese-Canadian internment 
camps, can reinforce the sincerity of an official apology. Africans 
discussing the possibility of an apology from the “West” for the slave 
trade almost uniformly said that without some material compensation 
an apology would be useless.21 By contrast, surviving WWII British 
prisoners of war and civilian internees disagree about whether the 
Japanese government owed them financial compensation.22 
Experimental psychological work on interpersonal apologies revealed 
that for some individuals, “withholding financial compensation 
undermines the effectiveness of an apology,” but in general, 
withholding financial compensation would not mean that an apology 
would be deemed inadequate.23 
In the case of historical apologies, financial compensation is 
often impractical as the offended group, such as women in the 
Roman Catholic Church, is so large as to undermine any attempt to 
financially compensate individuals. Moreover, some wronged people 
reject financial compensation as “blood money,” as in the 
acrimonious debate in Israel in the early 1950s about whether that 
state should accept financial reparations from Germany.24 And some 
                                                 
19 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and 
Mass Violence (Boston, Beacon Press, 1998), 104. 
20 Smith, 238.  
21 Howard-Hassmann, 145-49. 
22 Michael Cunningham, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese and the Politics of Apology: A 
Battle over History and Memory,’ Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 39, no. 4, 2004: 
561-74.  
23 Craig W. Blatz, Karina Schumann, and Michael Ross, ‘Government Apologies 
for Historical Injustices,’ Political Psychology, vol. 30, no.2, 2009: 233, 237.  
24 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, ‘Forgive and Not Forget: Reconciliation 
Between Forgiveness and Resentment,’ in Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, eds., 
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individuals or groups who were wronged would consider payment of 
financial reparations a further assault on their human dignity. Thus, 
there are times when an apology not only does stand alone, but ought 
to.  Apologies in and of themselves do contain significant potential 
for “moral repair.”25 
 
Apologies as a Social Movement  
Political apologies became common in the late twentieth century, 
especially in Western society, as a response to wider social forces. 
These wider social forces included changes in religious thinking and 
values, especially among Christians who after 1945 debated 
Christianity’s role in the Holocaust. Internal changes within the 
Christian community also reflected a newer Western humanism, 
which in turn both contributed to and reinforced the creation of the 
post-WWII human rights regime, with its stress on the equal dignity 
and worth of all human beings, starting with the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Starting in the 1960s, there were also 
new social movements in Western states for the civil rights of 
African-Americans, for women’s rights, and for gay and lesbian 
rights, which resulted in legal and public policy reform. These social 
movements relied in part on personal testimony of those who had 
been harmed, as reflected, for example, in the women’s movement 
slogan that ‘the personal is political.’ Both the experiences of those 
who were oppressed and the desire of those who were members of 
the oppressing groups to make amends contributed to a culture of 
confessions and a social expectation that confession—or apology—
could constitute absolution for past sins. The idea that victims 
deserved recognition and deserved to have their stories heard became 
more prominent in Western discourse and ideologies,26 and 
                                                                                                             
Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation ( Stanford, CA, Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 92. 
25 Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, ‘Taking Wrongs Seriously: A Qualified 
Defence of Public Apologies,’ Saskatchewan Law Review, vol. 65, 2002: 139.   
26 Frank Furedi, Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age, (London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
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eventually intersected with other ideals of reconciliation such as the 
South African stress on ubuntu, or community. 
  As of the 1990s, these new social ideals began to influence 
new mechanisms of post-conflict resolution such as truth 
commissions, with their stress on agreed narratives, personal healing, 
and intra- or inter-state reconciliation. Many scholars argued that 
such reconciliation was a prerequisite to social trust, itself a 
prerequisite to a functioning liberal democracy. Thus, a social 
movement to encourage official apologies began among those 
responsible for rebuilding torn societies ostensibly in transition to 
democracy.  
Within already established liberal democracies, official 
apologies were used to try to build or re-establish trust between 
authorities and previously marginalized or oppressed groups. 
Sometimes, apologies were offered for particular incidents that 
symbolized the systemic marginalization of large groups, as when 
Canada’s Prime Minister Harper apologized in 2008 to the entire 
Indo-Canadian community for a 1914 incident in which Canadian 
authorities returned a boatload of predominantly Sikh would-be 
immigrants to India, where the British killed 38 and imprisoned or 
transported many more.27 When apologies are not offered, victims of 
past wrongs may continue to mistrust current governments, even if 
financial reparations are offered. Australian aboriginal people were 
allocated funds in 1997 for health, counseling and family services in 
recognition of their suffering under the ‘Stolen Children’ policy 
which removed aboriginal children from their families, but then 
Prime Minister Howard refused to apologize for the policy.28 The 
apology offered by Howard’s successor, Kevin Rudd, as soon as he 
took office in 2008, movingly acknowledged the responsibility of the 
government for the harm done to the aboriginal community. 
Whether apologies were offered, however, often had more to 
do with who sought them than with the objective situations that 
                                                 
27Matt James, ‘Scaling memory: Reparation displacement and the case of BC,’ 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 42, no. 2, 2009: 366.   
28 T.L. Zutlevics, ‘Recognition, Responsibility and Apology,’ Public Affairs Quarterly, 
vol. 16, no. 1, 2002. 
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particular groups might have suffered in the past. Apologies are not a 
free good; if groups do not seek them, they are unlikely to be offered, 
at least by governments (religious communities do sometimes offer 
apologies that have not been sought). A successful social movement 
for an apology requires moral entrepreneurs to lead it, organizational 
resources to garner followers who agree that there should be an 
apology, contacts with the press and other organizations that will 
support the demand, public support, and leverage over the 
government of some kind. The event for which an apology is sought 
should offend current standards of morality; for example, slavery, 
genocide, mass torture, severe violations of equality rights, or 
deprivation of property. The victims of the event should be an easily 
identifiable, cohesive group, acknowledged by outsiders to constitute 
a collective entity. A short ‘causal chain’ between the alleged 
perpetrator and the crime will make it easier to establish the case for 
an apology: for example, the causal chain between Nazism and the 
extermination of the Jews is much shorter than that between the 
slave trade and underdevelopment in Africa. If the event for which 
an apology is sought was discrete and bounded in time, an apology is 
easier to obtain that if the event was pervasive and continuous. If 
there is an expectation that the apology will be followed by financial 
reparations, then it is also easier to apologize if a small number of 
people were affected by the transgression, as the costs of reparations 
will be correspondingly lower.29  
Apologies to both Japanese-Americans and Japanese-
Canadians, for example, were for discrete acts that took place during 
WWII, that lasted only a few years, and that affected relatively small 
numbers of people, an even smaller number of whom were still alive 
when the apologies and financial reparations were offered. Apologies 
for actions and omissions that took place over many years, affecting 
many millions of people, are harder to come by. Thus, there has been 
no national US apology to African-Americans for their centuries of 
enslavement and discrimination. By contrast, there have been 
apologies for specific incidents affecting smaller numbers of African-
                                                 
29 Howard-Hassmann, 47-50.  
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Americans. In 1997 President Clinton apologized for the Tuskegee 
‘medical experiments’ conducted in the mid-20th century, in which 
African-American men with syphilis were denied treatment so that 
the progress of the disease could be studied. Individual American 
institutions, such as the University of Alabama, also apologized for 
specific acts, such as allowing professors to own slaves and 
occupying buildings built by slaves.30  
Similarly, the Canadian government has never issued an 
apology to African-Canadians (Canadians of African descent), some 
of whose ancestors were enslaved in Canada until 1833, and who, as 
a group, are consistently ranked among the poorest in Canada. In the 
African-Canadian case, the victim group is not easily identifiable. 
African-Canadians are split among those whose ancestors were 
enslaved; those whose ancestors escaped to Canada from the US 
after 1833 to live in freedom; and those whose ancestors—or who 
themselves—moved to Canada more recently. It would be difficult to 
unite this community in search of an apology and difficult to decide 
for what exactly an apology should be sought. On the other hand, the 
Mayor of the city of Halifax, Nova Scotia apologized in 2010 for the 
destruction in the 1960s of an African-Canadian community known 
as Africville, ostensibly to improve residents’ living standards by 
moving them to housing with better access to services, but possibly 
also to make way for a new transportation route. This confirms the 
theory that it is easier to apologize for discrete events affecting 
relatively few people at a particular time than to apologize for events 
spanning several centuries and affecting many generations.  
 
Apologies and Reconciliation 
In the ideal model of interpersonal apologies, something like the 
following occurs: 
 
                                                 
30 Alfred L. Brophy, ‘The University and the Slaves: Apology and Its Meaning,’ in 
Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Niklaus 
Steiner, eds., The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past (Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 109-19. 
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Apology (acknowledgement of the facts, taking responsibility for the 
harm done, expression of sorrow and remorse, promise of non-
repetition) → forgiveness→ restored good relations→ increased 
interpersonal trust→ reconciliation.  
 
All of these aspects of the process except forgiveness are also 
necessary to official apologies. 
Analysts of interpersonal apologies frequently address the 
question of forgiveness and the conditions under which recipients are 
willing or unwilling to forgive apologizers for their transgressions. 
The definition of forgiveness varies: for some analysts, mere 
acceptance of an apology implies forgiveness, while for others, 
forgiveness is a deep psychological process in which the recipient of 
the apology relinquishes his anger or desire for vengeance, 
“surrendering the right to get even,”31 and is able to focus on other 
matters, thus “moving on” (to resort to popular parlance).   
Characteristics of interpersonal apologies may not have any 
relevance for collective apologies, however. Deep psychological 
forgiveness is not necessary in the chain of causality from official 
apology to reconciliation; it is enough that the victim of past wrongs 
formally accepts the apology and in so doing abandons his desire for 
revenge. Some analysts of recent attempts at national reconciliation 
have criticized pressure on individual victims to forgive after 
apologies for political acts have been offered; for example, in the case 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.32 But it 
is not clear that there is any necessity for forgiveness in official 
situations, even if for personal reasons, a victim might be better off 
letting go of resentment by forgiving the violation rather than 
holding a grudge.   
In an official apology, it might be enough to substitute a 
restored sense of self-worth for forgiveness. A frequent assertion in 
the psychological literature is that an interpersonal apology 
                                                 
31Michael Henderson, Forgiveness: Breaking the Chain of Hate (Wilsonville, Oregon: 
Book Partners, 1999),  2. 
32 Annelies Verdoolaege, ‘Managing Reconciliation at the Human Rights Violations 
Hearings of the South African TRC,’ Journal of Human Rights, 5, 1, 2006: 61-80. 
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contributes to the moral recognition and acknowledgement of 
victims’ sense of human worth and dignity. Recipients of apologies 
will enjoy a restored sense of self when it is confirmed that they did 
not bring their sufferings on themselves and are not responsible for 
what happened to them.33 In political as in interpersonal relations, 
apologies can result in restoration of the victim group’s sense of self-
worth. When the perpetrator has publicly acknowledged harm and 
expressed remorse, victims can be assured that the crime is not likely 
to be repeated. This may give the former victims more self-
confidence about participating in the wider society.  
The principal function of official apologies is the restoration 
of civil relationships between the apologizer and recipients, whether 
or not the recipients personally forgive the apologizer. In the case of 
diplomatic apologies, civil relations can be assumed to be restored 
once both sides have agreed on the wording and ritual of the apology 
and it has been delivered and accepted. In the case of political 
apologies, restoration or creation of good relations can help to 
prevent future outbreaks of violence or vengeance; thus, despite 
bitter memories of WWII and occasional acts of Chinese nationalist 
hostility to Japan (perhaps orchestrated by the government), relations 
between Japan and the Asian states it had colonized have been 
peaceful since 1945. In the case of historical apologies, restoration of 
good relations might prevent an unanticipated outbreak of vengeful 
violence, for example, if a group becomes preoccupied with 
memories of its past victimization to the point that it resorts to 
violence to avenge past wrongs.  
 The formal offer and acceptance of apologies, followed by 
restored civil relations, can contribute to increased social trust 
between previously antagonistic or estranged groups. Lazare argues 
that “the apology process holds out…the prospect of restored 
respect, of healed relationships, of civility, and of a clearer sense of 
morality among individuals and nations who inhabit an ever-
shrinking world.”34 In international relations, trust is more likely 
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34 Lazare, 203. 
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among previously warring groups if they apologize to each other for 
harms they have committed. Apologies within nations might result in 
development of a thin type of “civic trust” among citizens;35 even if 
they do not yet consider themselves to be part of the same national 
community, groups of citizens can assume that actual hostilities have 
ended. A thin sort of cosmopolitan trust can also emerge from 
international apologies, as in the case of relations between Germany 
and Israel, which gradually were based on trust from the 1950s on. In 
this sense, apologies are confidence-building measures, increasing the 
likelihood that former enemies can interact civilly. Once more 
confidence is built between formerly antagonistic parties, trust can 
thicken to the point that they are actually reconciled to living with 
each other.  
In official situations, reconciliation does not require victims 
to forgive, nor do victims need to reconcile in any interpersonal sense 
with their former oppressors; it is enough that previously antagonistic 
groups can function together in the public sphere without further 
conflict or mistrust. The apologizer and recipients of an apology 
should ideally be able to interact together in the marketplace, in 
public institutions such as schools, and in politics, treating each other 
respectfully as equals. At the same time, the victims of the acts for 
which the apologies were offered can continue to live their private 
lives separately from the perpetrators of the crimes or the group to 
which the perpetrator belongs.  It is possible to combine public, civic 
reconciliation with private, personal mistrust; reconciliation might 
simply mean “a mutual agreement to co-exist.”36 
Thus, the following model describes an ideal process of 
official apology, as opposed to an interpersonal one:  
 
Apology → victims’ restored sense of self-worth→ restored good 
relations→ increased social trust→ reconciliation. 
                                                 
35 Pablo de Greiff, ‘The Role of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes: 
On Making Trustworthy Institutions Trusted,’ in Gibney et al., 126. 
36 Joanna R. Quinn, ‘Introduction’ to Joanna R. Quinn, ed. Reconciliation(s): 
Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies ( Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009),  12. 
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This model removes psychological and religious variables from 
analysis of political reconciliation, acknowledging that official 
apologies are political tools, not interpersonal acts. 
 
A Skeptical View of Official Apologies 
If official apologies have positive reconciliatory effects, they may be a 
powerful political tool.  Nevertheless, we have no systematic 
evidence that they do have such effects. What we assume to be a 
consequence of an apology may be the consequence of other factors 
linked to it. 
 It may be that the social and political conditions that precede 
the apology are more influential than the apology itself. When leaders 
of liberal democracies offer historical apologies, for example, they are 
often apologizing to ethnic or religious groups who no longer suffer 
discrimination, as is the case for Japanese-Canadians and Japanese-
Americans. By contrast, when leaders of liberal democracies 
apologize to social groups such as aboriginal people who still suffer 
discrimination and other social impediments, the apology itself does 
little but buttress a fragile trust that may be broken if concrete 
measures to ameliorate their suffering do not follow. Similarly, 
although the Catholic Church has offered numerous apologies for its 
sins of the distant past, its apologies for sins of the more recent past, 
especially physical and sexual abuse of children in its care, have rung 
hollow, as more and more cases of abuse are revealed and there is 
more and more evidence that the Church tried to conceal evidence 
and protect its personnel from prosecution. Many Irish Catholics 
reacted with disappointment to the Pope’s apology in March 2010 for 
child abuse committed by members of the Roman Catholic clergy.37  
Liberal democratic governments often apologize for acts that 
are already completely beyond the pale in present-day politics; thus, 
the promise of non-repetition rings hollow as non-repetition is 
already guaranteed. It is easy to apologize for past racial 
                                                 
37 Pamela Newenham, ‘Mixed reaction to pope’s letter,’ irishtimes.com, March 20, 
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discrimination, mass internments of members of particular ethno-
national groups, or refusal to permit people from particular parts of 
the world to immigrate, given that all such policies were outlawed 
several decades ago in liberal democracies. Liberal democratic 
governments do not apologize for continued systematic violations of 
human rights, such as the below-subsistence welfare payments that 
many governments offer the poor.  
Sometimes, apologies appear to be offered more for self-
serving reasons than as a result of genuine contrition. For example, 
the motivation behind the apology by Stephen Harper, a 
Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, to the Indo-Canadian 
community for the government’s exclusion of a boatload of Indian 
immigrants almost a hundred years ago might have been to garner 
votes from Indo-Canadians, an ethnic constituency that had 
traditionally voted for the Liberal Party. When apologies are offered 
by states to groups who are weak political actors, the reason may be 
to bolster the apologizer’s own self-image as a legitimate, democratic 
entity. On February 23, 2010 Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the 
United Kingdom apologized to British ‘home children,’ adults who 
were deported as children from poverty-stricken families in the UK 
to live and work in Canada and Australia, where they were often 
severely exploited and sexually assaulted. Brown knew that such a 
crime would never be repeated, and that the surviving home children 
were not a politically powerful group.  
 Often the most egregious violators of human rights and 
humanitarian law are those least likely to apologize. Imperialist 
countries do not apologize for histories and continued practices of 
conquest; President Clinton’s apology to Guatemalans in 1999 for 
having supported their brutal military rulers was notable for its 
rarity.38 ‘Apologies’ by the US government for the tortures and other 
excesses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq consistently misled the public 
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about what actually happened and blamed subordinates rather than 
those who ordered the torture.39 
Finally, those individuals who actually commit evil acts 
frequently do not experience the remorse or shame that it is 
comforting to assume everyone must feel for violating the common 
moral code. When asked at his trial in Israel in 1961 whether he felt 
any remorse for his part in exterminating Europe’s Jewish 
population, Adolf Eichmann replied in the negative, stating 
“Remorse is for children.”40 Not everyone feels remorse: some 
people enjoy seeing others suffer. Political ideologies, religious or 
cultural beliefs, and indoctrination can also so affect entire 
populations that they feel little or no remorse for their cruel actions, 
as Goldhagen argues was the case for ordinary Germans who helped 
to enact Nazi exterminatory policies.41 Perpetrators do not necessarily 
have any desire to apologize, especially if apologizing is “potentially 
humiliating”.42 Often the party that wants the wronged to forgive and 
forget is the party that committed the injustice in the first place.43 
There may also be cultural barriers to apologizing in societies where 
saving face is a more important value than recreating community 
between perpetrators and victims, or where intergenerational 
vendettas between feuding parties are considered to be socially 
honourable. In such cases, neither side may wish to release itself from 
the “grip of history.”44  
                                                 
39 Mark Gibney and Niklaus Steiner, ‘Apology and the American “War on Terror”’, 
in Gibney et al., 287-97. 
40 Harry Mulisch, Criminal Case 40/61, the Trial of Adolf Eichmann: An Eyewitness 
Account, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 5. 
41 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (New York, Vintage Books, 1997). 
42 Tavuchis, 9.  
43 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?,’ in 
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On the other side of the coin, ideologies and indoctrination 
can also create a “politics of aggrieved memories” on the part of 
victim groups.45 Such victims may not wish to acknowledge the 
possibility of a common moral universe with the perpetrators of the 
crimes against them, even if the perpetrators offer to apologize. In 
some cases, the crime may simply be too horrendous for victims to 
have any interest in reconciliation, even if they do not intentionally 
wish to hold on to their grievances. Those who lost close family 
members in the Holocaust, for example, might consider that the 
more appropriate action is to refuse forgiveness and reconciliation, 
and hope that the formal institutions of justice will punish the 
perpetrators. Similarly, some survivors of people murdered during 
the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa did not want to reconcile 
or forgive; they wanted the perpetrators tried and punished.   
In cases where neither party to a political conflict is 
completely innocent, as each has perpetrated crimes against the other, 
a one-sided apology might simply aggravate the grievances of the 
other side. The people of the Republika Srpska, the Serbian part of 
Bosnia, apparently feel little remorse for the brutalities of the 1990s 
wars in ex-Yugoslavia, instead considering themselves the aggrieved 
party.46 Psychological studies of interpersonal apologies suggest that 
defensive individuals or those with low self-esteem will react to an 
apology that acknowledges the facts of harm as a confirmation of 
their feelings of having been wronged, increasing their desire for 
revenge:47 so might some Serbians react to an apology from Croatians 
or Muslims. Likewise, if the Serbian government were to offer an 
apology and ask for forgiveness, there could be an internal backlash if 
some Serbian citizens thought that the request for forgiveness 
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presented their “collective identity in a negative light.”48 Psychological 
studies also show that interdependent individuals—those more 
connected to others—are more likely to forgive transgressions than 
those who are independent and less connected to others. 49 If there 
are national cultures, either based on collective norms and 
behavioural patterns or created by political propaganda, then cultures 
that consider themselves superior to others might be less likely both 
to apologize and to accept apologies than those that are more 
connected to outsiders. 
In any event, we do not know whether inter-group apologies 
among the various actors in the Yugoslavia wars would have any 
concrete effect. Considering German apologies to Jews, we do know 
that Jews do not terrorize Germans and we might plausibly conclude 
that they do not do so because the Germans acknowledged their guilt 
and took responsibility to repair relations. But Germany also paid 
substantial financial reparations both to individual Jewish victims of 
the Holocaust and to Israel; these concrete reparations may mean 
more than the apologies, which—as distinct from acknowledgement 
of harm—were not actually made until 1970, when the then 
Chancellor of Germany, Willy Brandt, famously fell to his knees in 
front of a memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943. It may 
also be that Jews do not terrorize Germans because they now live in 
liberal democratic states such as Canada, the United States and Israel 
where they are not threatened, or because they are more preoccupied 
by other matters such as the continued Israeli conflict with 
Palestinians. Moreover, unlike many current cases in which it is 
hoped that political apologies will contribute to conflict resolution, 
Jews and Germans do not compete for territory, resources, or power. 
It is interesting to speculate whether a mutual apology between 
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Israelis and Palestinians would have any reconciliatory effect, without 
resolution of territorial disputes and the end of Israeli occupation. 
Not only do apologies not necessarily result in reconciliation, 
but reconciliation might not necessarily require apology. Germany 
did not apologize for its conquest of France during WWII, yet France 
and Germany reconciled quickly in the 1950s, as it was in France’s 
interest to regard its former enemy as its new friend in the evolving 
Cold War world.50 On the other hand, while apology is not necessary 
for reconciliation, perpetrators of crimes must not deny what 
happened. Denial can result in anger and calls for rupture of political 
ties, as occurs when Japanese political conservatives decry apologies 
from Japan to South Korea for colonialism and conquest. Denial also 
increases the former victim’s perception that the former perpetrator 
of a crime is still a threat, a serious matter in international relations.51     
Thus, it appears that combined with other methods of 
conflict resolution, political and historical apologies may help to 
ameliorate conflict, but we do not yet have any testable evidence that 
they do,52 whether or not they are supplemented by other policies 
such as financial reparations. We do seem to have evidence that 
diplomatic apologies alleviate the potential for conflict, but that may 
be because they are a common method of statecraft, rather than a 
new method to remedy or forestall inter-state conflict. The efficacy 
of apologies should not be discounted; for example, when a 
government expresses sincere remorse to a collectivity that previously 
felt excluded from national society. But we should be careful not to 
assume that an official apology can be as efficacious as interpersonal 
apologies seem to be. To impute psychological theories about 
individuals to entire nations is to commit the fallacy of composition; 
imputation of charitable emotions of forgiveness and reconciliation is 
no more valid that imputation of desires for vengeance. The author 
of The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit may be willing to forgive the 
Egyptians who expelled her and her family, after one Egyptian 
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diplomat apologized, but this does not mean that hundreds of 
thousands of other Jews will forgive Arab states for their expulsions. 
 
 
